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John Uglietta 
Syinposiu.In on J:?iversity 
and Affirinative Action 
Justice and Affirmative Action 
Affirmative action at Grand Valley, particularly at this point in the his-tory of the University, raises a very important and, I think, interesting 
question. It is unfortunate that most of the debate here and elsewhere 
misses this important question. Like many midwestern schools, Grand 
Valley has long lived with the contrast of young graduate students from 
liberal east coast schools, who now find themselves as teachers amidst a 
rather conservative midwestern population. Also, students, as they get 
their first taste of the life of the mind, grab hold of ideas, sometimes too 
quickly-sometimes not so wisely, which put them at odds with their 
fellow students or their parents. However, the current situation at Grand 
Valley is more dynamic and vibrant. In the past, Grand Valley has seen 
relatively few minority students. Now the university draws more students 
from farther afield-Detroit, Chicago, and beyond. The new students bring 
a wider array of experiences, viewpoints, and opinions, raising the level, 
pitch, and importance of political debate. My aim here is to show that much 
of the current debate regarding affirmative action suffers from conceptual 
confusion and allows the important questions regarding affirmative action 
to escape notice and the proposed answers to escape proper scrutiny. 
While affirmative action has not split the public down the usual party 
lines as nearly as some other issues, it does raise a question of political -
morality that often divides liberals from conservatives and libertarians-a 
fundamental question of the meaning of justice in America. Almost all 
of the contemporary debate on affirmative action enlists some claim of 
fairness or justice. Often the claim is not spelled out clearly or explicidy 
but is simply alluded to in metaphorical images of a "color-blind society" 
or a "level playing field."These metaphors are meant to excite a sense of 
fairness, but they do not help us think about what fairness means, or what 
makes treatment fair or just. However, it is the failure to dig deeper here 
that results in our confusion, as the strongest arguments for and against 
affirmative action rely on very different notions of fairness or justice. 
'Jreating Everyone the Same 
Both views of justice begin from the classic idea that justice requires that 
we treat people in similar circumstances in a similar manner. If you and 
I are in similar circumstance, we ought to be treated the same. As we 
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say, "we should treat like cases alike." However, in articulating what this 
doctrine requires, the two competing views of justice focus on different 
types of circumstances and end up yielding very different results in some 
cases. While one of these views is more readily recognized, once the 
other is identified, people find they believe in it no less strongly than the 
alternative. The first view begins from the common intuition that when 
we deal with each other, things like race and gender should not change 
the way we are treated. The second view of justice draws on the belief that 
we are all created equal and deserve equal chances in life, again, regardless 
of things like race or gender. It is the pull we feel toward each of these 
different views that fuels the interesting and difficult questions regarding 
affirmative action. 
The 'fransactional View of Justice 
The more readily recognized view of justice is often enlisted to explain 
opposition to affirmative action. The easiest way to understand this view 
of justice is to begin with the general idea of treating like cases alike and 
looking at these cases rather narrowly. On this view, requirements of justice 
enter our lives most often when we engage in transactions with others.lt 
is easiest here to speak of transferring property. We have property that is 
our own, by which we mean we have a right to it. This property could be 
things like money, food, a house, a car, or a bottle of scotch, but it could 
also be rights that we have. In transactions, I trade some of my property 
(money) for some other property, and this must be done fairly:The ideal of 
the fair trade is when both parties to the trade freely agree to the terms. So 
I cannot threaten or force the cashier to accept less money for the goods, 
and I cannot simply run out without paying. We could also trade rights. 
If I had a right to park in a special spot on campus, I could trade that 
right to you just like it were some other sort of more tangible property. 
Ifl own anything, I am free to keep it or trade it. Justice merely requires 
that the trades are fair and the fairness simply means we enter into them 
and accept them freely. 
When a transaction is not fair, the way to rectifY the injustice is to put 
the parties back in the positions in which they began. Ifl steal a car from 
you, my acquisition is unjust, as you did not freely agree to the exchange. 
The way to fix this is to take the car from me and give it back to you. 
This transactional view of justice can be seen in matters of equal pro-
tection of the laws in the form of principles prohibiting discrimination . 
The most common case is the prohibition of discrimination based on 
race. Race should not affect how we are treated. Race is not like the age 
of the 12 year old who wants to buy a bottle of scotch; it is not a relevant 
difference in circumstance. For example, if a black man is denied the 
rights or opportunities given to a similarly situated white man, equality 
and justice require that we restore his rights and opportunities by taking 
them back from the people who wrongly acquired them. Suppose a com-
pany has routinely denied the benefits of seniority to its black workers 
but not its white workers.The just remedy would be to take these benefits 
back from those who do not deserve them (white workers who enjoy the 
benefits but have less seniority than the black workers) and restore them 
to the black workers. Many discussions of affirmative action draw on the 
transactional view of justice and claim to seek this type of remedy. The 
trouble is that most contemporary affirmative action plans do not seem 
to fit this model. 
As many see it, most contemporary affirmative action plans recognize a 
harm or loss to person A but then attempt to rectifY this wrong by giving 
a benefit to a different person B. What is worse, the benefit given to B 
is taken from a person who never took anything from A or B. Consider 
affirmative action plans in college admissions. The plans begin from the 
recognition that some black students have suffered from discrimination. 
The plans then grant the benefit of college admission to some student 
without regard to whether he actually suffered from discrimination and 
do so by denying admission to a white student who never benefited from 
the discrimination against the black student. Thus, a poor, black, inner-city 
student suffers from discrimination while an affluent black student from 
an excellent suburban school district is admitted to college at the expense 
of one of his white classmates. Here it seems that the plan attempts to 
remedy the theft of one person's rights by stealing from another and 
giving the stolen property to a third person. It punishes the wrong person, 
benefits the wrong person, and leaves the one who suffered with nothing. 
It is no wonder that many find these plans to be a miscarriage of justice 
or "reverse-discrimination." 
It is unfortunate that so many defenders of affirmative action follow 
this same line of argument, relying on the transactional view of justice. 
Some attempt to identifY a general harm to all blacks, even affluent, well-
educated ones, and some general benefit to whites, even poor ones new 
to this country. They claim that affirmative action merely rectifies this 
situation. These efforts seem unlikely to persuade. As those in opposition 
point out, if there is some real harm, we ought to be able to identifY it 
and determine which black students suffer from it and base affirmative 
action plans on its presence rather than on race. If the harm is not one 
we can see but must accept that all blacks suffer, then many will not find 
such a mysterious harm serious enough for action or amenable to this 
type of solution. Indeed how would one even know if we had remedied 
or diminished such harm? 
The Egalitarian View of justice 
Both those supporting and those opposing affirmative action miss the 
important question when they limit themselves to the transactional view 
John Uglietta 
9 
~ 
0 
10 · ~ 
..j....J 
u 
~ 
Q) 
~ 
·~ 
..j....J 
ro 
s 
~ 
·~ ~ I : 
~ 
r-c:l 
~ 
ro 
c 
·~ 
rJ) 
~ 
~ 
·~ ~ 
of justice. The strongest arguments for affirmative action are supported by 
a different, more deeply egalitarian, view of justice. While the transactional 
view of justice can be said to begin from the intuition that whenever people 
deal with business, government or each other, their race or gender should 
not matter in how they are treated, this egalitarian view begins from the 
intuition that all people should have equal chances for success in their 
lives, regardless of their race or gender-one's prospects in life should 
not be limited simply because of race or gender. If this is not an ideal of 
universal justice, at the very least, it seems like an ideal of American justice. 
The laws and other institutions of society, particularly those that purport 
to establish equality, ought to be structured and interpreted in a way to 
ensure this equal opportunity for all. 
In the egalitarian view, if some group persistently suffers from a disad-
vantage in society, then justice requires that the institutions of society be 
changed in a way that will remove the disadvantage. Here the rules and 
institutions of society are not taken as natural. Rather they are created 
and maintained by a society. The ideal of a just society with just rules and 
institutions is one in which all members of society have equal opportunity 
or equal prospects for a good life. If one is born female, she should not 
suffer from fewer chances for success in life. And if one is born black, he 
too should not suffer diminished prospects for success. In this view, the 
metaphors for a "color-blind" society or a "level playing field" apply at a 
basic level of chances for success in life. 
In the United States today, or any other day so far, people born black or 
born female do not enjoy the same opportunities or chances for success as 
those who are white or male. Blacks and women of comparable talent to 
contemporary white males make less money, achieve less political power, 
and hold lower business and social status. Both constitute identifiable, and 
more important, disadvantaged groups. 
In the egalitarian view of justice, social institutions should be structured 
to promote equality. If society finds that some of its members do not enjoy 
equal life prospects, justice compels that it alter its rules and institutions 
to reduce the inequality. It is here that affirmative action plans come in. 
Affirmative action plans create or alter the rules of society in an attempt 
to reduce or eliminate disadvantage. For example, blacks may be favored 
in college admissions for a number of reasons. Most apparent, the students 
directly affected would be encouraged and enabled to attend college and 
thus better situated to achieve greater success in professional and political 
life. However, the effects do not stop there. In their chosen fields, these 
people may later serve the black community more than it is currently 
served by, say, providing better legal, medical, and financial services, raising 
the prospects of a wider group of blacks. Another effect of these services 
might be to reduce the economic disadvantages that keep some blacks out 
of college. Also, the students will serve as examples both to their peers 
in their professions and to younger members of the black community. In 
their profession, their success will break down any residual bias through 
personal association and by giving them the opportunity to show their 
talents. In the black community, their success will show others that these 
professions and these types of success are open and possible for them as 
well, inspiring them to achieve more than they otherwise would have. 
Over time, these effects would seem likely to diminish the disadvantage 
to blacks as a group and improve the prospects of one born black. 
Consequences of the Mistake 
In failing to identify the egalitarian view of justice, both sides in the 
debate over affirmative action have focused on the transactional view. This 
confusion has caused them to debate the wrong questions. For example, 
when opponents point out that some people who benefit directly from 
affirmative action have not suffered from discrimination, the egalitarian 
may readily agree. For the egalitarian, those who benefit directly, say by 
being admitted to college, are preferred, not because they have suffered 
from ~iscrimination, but because they are situated in a way to make them 
useful in alleviating the disadvantage blacks suffer as a group. Also when 
some suggest that the government has not caused current discrimination 
(since state sponsored discrimination ended some time ago),it should not 
be used to remedy it. Here too the egalitarian may be unconcerned. If the 
disadvantage exists, it does not matter how it was caused. It still must be 
remedied. Unless knowing the causes of the discrimination will help us 
determine how to alleviate it, egalitarians may think it is irrelevant. 
One particular point calls for special attention here, as it seems to be 
the source of much discontent with affirmative action plans. Many people 
oppose affirmative action because they see it as taking something away 
from a white person who was not responsible for the problem in the first 
place, punishing the wrong person. It is very important to recognize that 
affirmative action in the United States does not take anything away from 
anyone, certainly not anything a person could claim a right to have. Again 
in the case of college admissions, some say that a white student's spot in 
college is taken from him and given to a black student. However, there is 
no reason to say the spot belonged to the white person. Colleges distribute 
the opportunity to attend the school. They determine how to distribute 
this benefit. A college can prefer admission of students with any type of 
characteristic that will help the college fulfill its societal function be it 
mathematical ability, creativity, life experience, civic involvement, athletic 
ability, residence in the state, or race. No student could claim to own a spot 
in college until the college offers admission. Admission to college may be 
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given to some and denied to others, but nothing that anyone owns is ever 
taken from one to provide for another. While almost all advocates of affir-
mative action in the U.S. recognize a limit and would prevent affirmative 
action plans from ever taking the legitimate property of another, this is not 
true in all countries. To see the difference, one could look to Zimbabwe 
where the government took land owned by white farmers and gave it to 
black farmers. In the U.S., affirmative action plans do not take property 
away. They do not take the books or car of a white student and give them 
to a black student. A white student's only claim of injustice arises from 
being treated differendy. He cannot claim that a spot was taken from him 
by the black student any more than he can claim that a spot was taken 
from him by the student with a much higher GPA or SAT score. 
Part of the difficulty with the egalitarian view may be more apparent 
now-it presents a more complicated picture. The transactional view pres-
ents a simple and readily understandable picture of restoring something to 
those who have lost it. However, the egalitarian view relies on speculation 
about a series of connected societal results. The plan relies on these mea-
sures actually reducing the disadvantage of the broader group through the 
expected chain of reactions. One could agree with the egalitarian principle 
and even agree with affirmative action yet still think it will not achieve 
the results we seek. You could disagree about the likely results of the 
plan. For example, you might think that black students admitted through 
affirmative action plans will not succeed in college, or that employers will 
not hire them, thinking them less qualified as a result of having been held 
to lower standards. If this is true, the plan probably will not alleviate the 
disadvantage blacks suffer. Such concerns would recognize and accept 
the justice of affirmative action but question the method of preferential 
treatment in college admissions. A person might think we would reduce 
disadvantage better by spending a disproportionate amount of resources 
on improving primary education of black children. This would still accept 
the basic idea of affirmative action. 
In describing the egalitarian view in support of affirmative action, 
it may seem that I have been advocating for it. I have emphasized this 
view primarily because it is less well known and will strike many people 
as different and confusing. Providing a justification of either view would 
require much more than sketching the oudines of the view, as I have done 
here. Indeed this is just the problem. We never get to this debate here at 
Grand Valley or elsewhere. Both the transactional view of justice and the 
egalitarian view exert a strong pull on our moral sensibilities. We do think 
that people should be treated the same in transactions regardless of their 
race or gender. And we also think that people should have reasonable life 
prospects regardless of race or gender. However, in their pure forms, both 
views also lead to conclusions we might find difficult to accept. Which 
one is better? Is there an alternative? What can we learn from each view? 
Without recognizing that these are two quite different views we will never 
investigate these questions, and we will never have a proper debate. And 
this will be a disadvantage to all. 
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